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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
to the General Council and its agencies from being expended for
functions not authorized by their respective charters and consti-
tutions as they existed at the date of the court's decree.
It is highly gratifying to observe that the three courts who
dealt with this case realized the effect their judgment would have,
not only upon the parties to the suit, but also to the entire struc-
ture of a distinguished Protestant sect. The facts of the contro-
versy were reviewed extensively in an attempt to do justice to all
the conflicting interests.
Court of Claims Act
In Cimo v. State,7 claimant asked leave to file a claim for
damage to her real property, occasioned by a change of grade in
front of said property, in connection with a grade crossing elim-
ination structure instituted by the defendant. She conceded that
the claim was not filed within the six month period specified in
the Grade Crossing Elimination Act which gave rise to her cause
of action," but claimed that the more general provisions of the
Court of Claims Act9 enabled her to take advantage of the dis-
cretionary two year statute of limitations contained therein.10 The
Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Divisi6n's reversal of
the Court of Claims, held (6-1), that the claim was barred by the
six month statute of limitations in the specific statute giving rise
to her cause of action.1
The court pointed out that the claimant could advance only
two arguments in her favor. The first would necessitate the finding
that claims such as hers were governed by two statutes of limita-
tion: one of six months and another of two years. It is obvious
that the Legislature could not intend such duality.
The second form of reasoning is that the time limitations in
the earlier, specific statute were repealed, by implication, by the
general provisions of the Court of Claims Act. Repeal by imtli-
cation is not favored and will be decreed only where a clear intent
appears to effect that purpose. 2 The court pointed out unless
7. 306 N. Y. 143, 116 N. E. 2d 290 (1954).
8. L 1928, Chap. 678. McK. UNCONSOL. LAws § 7906.
9. CoURr OF CLAims AcT § 10 (4), (5).
10. Id. § 10 (5).
11. At Common law no such damages were recoverable. Conklin v. New York,
0. & HW. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 109, 6 N. E. 663 (1886). Heiser v. Mayor etc. of New York,
104 N. Y; 68. 9 N. E. 866 (1887).
12. City of New York v. Maltbie, 274 N. Y. 90, 97, 8 N. E. 2d 289, 292 (1937);
Mority v. United Brethrens Church, 269 N. Y. 125, 133, 199 N. E. 29, 31 (1935).
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there is a patent inconsistency between the two, a more general
statute will not reveal a more specific one.",
The court further pointed out that when the Grade 0rossing
Elimination Act became law in 1928, the Court of Claims Act
then in existence had a six month statute of limitations for all
claims not otherwise provided for with no discretionary extention.
Later when the Court of Claims Act was liberalized by giving
discretion to the court to extend the time beyond six months, no
such liberality was shown to the Grade Crossing Elimination Act.
Moreover, it is a general rule of law that when the legislature
creates a new right of action, and in the statute of creation im-
poses a time limitation, that limitation is part of the grant of
of power and the bringing of such action is subject to that limi-
tation and no other.14
Election Law
Statutes that require an employer to give his employees time
off on a general election day, so that they may exercise their
franchise, are common. 15 A minority of such statutes, including
the New York provisions," also provide that "no deduction shall
be made from the usual salary or wages of such voter." The con-
stitutionality of these latter statutes has been questioned on
several occasions in the state courts.' 7 The United States Supreme
Court, has recently held that they do not violate the Federal Con-
stitution.'
In Williams v. Aircooled Motors, Inc.,'9 defendant company
maintained a nine-hour day, the last hour being paid at time and
a half. On election day, plaintiff worked the first seven hours
and took off the last two hours of the day so that he could vote.
The company paid him nine hours straight pay for election day
13. People ex rel. Fleming v. Dalton, 158 N. Y. 175, 184, 52 N. E. 1113, 1116
(1899).
14. Gatti Paper Stock Corp. v. Erie R. R. Co., 247 App. Div. 45, 286 N. Y. Supp.
669 (1st Dep't 1936), aif'd 272 N. Y. 535, 4 N. E. 2d 724 (1936); Meng v. Bischoff, 227
N. Y. 264, 276; 125 N. E. 508, 511 (1919).
15. See, 47 COL. L. REv. 135 (1947).
16. ELECTION LAW § 226.
17. People v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 306 I1. 486, 138 N. E. 155, (1923);
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 632, 204 S. W. 2d 973 (1947) held
such statutes are unconstitutional because of a taking of property without due process
of law. The following cases have held such statutes to be constitutional: People v. Ford
Motor Co., 271 App. Div. 141, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 697 (3d Dep't 1946) ; Ballarini, in behalf
of Lodge 1327, ctc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 100 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 859, 226 P. 2d 771(1950); State v. International Harvester Co., - Minn. -, 63 N. W. 2d 547 (1954),
review denied 23 U. S. L. Week 3098 (U. S., Oct. 19, 1954).
18. Dray-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. State of Missouri, 342 U. S. 421 (1952).
19. 307 N. Y. 332, 121 N. E. 2d 251 (1954).
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